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Chapter 1
Adaptive Traffic Fingerprinting for Darknet
Threat Intelligence
Hamish Haughey, Gregory Epiphaniou, Haider Al-Khateeb, and Ali Dehghantanha
Abstract Darknet technology such as Tor has been used by various threat actors
for organising illegal activities and data exfiltration. As such there is a case for
organisations to block such traffic, or to try and identify when it is used and for
what purposes. However, anonymity in cyberspace has always been a domain of
conflicting interests. While it gives enough power to nefarious actors to masquerade
their illegal activities, it is also the corner stone to facilitate freedom of speech and
privacy. We present a proof of concept for a novel algorithm that could form the
fundamental pillar of a darknet-capable Cyber Threat Intelligence platform. The
solution can reduce anonymity of users of Tor, and considers the existing visibility of
network traffic before optionally initiating targeted or widespread BGP interception.
In combination with server HTTP response manipulation, the algorithm attempts to
reduce the candidate data set to eliminate client-side traffic that is most unlikely to be
responsible for server-side connections of interest. Our test results show that MITM
manipulated server responses lead to expected changes received by the Tor client.
Using simulation data generated by shadow, we show that the detection scheme is
effective with false positive rate of 0.001, while sensitivity detecting non-targets
was 0.016±0.127. Our algorithm could assist collaborating organisations willing to
share their threat intelligence or cooperate during investigations.
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1.1 Introduction
Threats to individuals and organisations from Cyber attackers have been observed
since the early days of computers and the Internet [48]. Threat actors have perpe-
trated various attacks ranging from relatively innocuous hoaxes to more impact-ful
instances of social engineering and reverse engineering to harvest credentials, hold
organisations to ransom for their data, or cause actual physical damage to systems
[30]. In response to this persistent threat from a wide range of actors with varying
motives and methods, a number of ontologies for Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)
have appeared over the years such as STIX and TAXII [10], OpenIOC [8], SCAP
[39], VERIS [46], Cybox [9], and RID and IODEF [25]. Given that so many ontolo-
gies exist to address some aspect of exchanging CTI, further work has attempted
to taxonomise these systems to understand their dependencies and interoperability
[6]. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that a critical part of an organisation’s CTI
capability requires the sharing of information with trusted peers [2]. This varied se-
lection of offerings highlights the importance of standardisation, as organisations
are likely to use a particular solution that may or not be compatible with that in use
by another organisation. A gap in the current offerings appears to be in satisfactorily
addressing Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) as a medium for threat actors to
perpetrate their nefarious activities undetected.
An example of threat actor behaviour is the use of encrypted channels for data ex-
filtration [20], and the challenge for organisations in identifying or blocking known
bad network locations has increased due to the readiness with which PET is now
available. Organisations are then faced with a choice, to allow or disallow traffic
originating from, or destined for, such PET on their networks. This choice is further
complicated by the open debate on privacy and data protection [13].
It is easily observable that long-standing concerns regarding privacy and anonymity
continue to grow among certain groups [47, 35, 17]. This may not come as a sur-
prise, considering the increasing capabilities of some organisations to monitor and
report on user behaviour in day to day activities [14].
Fuelling this debate, there have been recent legislations such as the Investigatory
Powers Bill in the UK proposed to require Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and
Mobile Operators to preserve meta-data on the activities of each Internet user [56].
This has resulted in greater use over time of PET such as The Onion Router (Tor)
[55, 15], The Invisible Internet Project (i2p) [24], and Freenet [52], for a wide range
of reasons, and no longer limited to cyber-espionage or illegal activities.
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a suitable example of a technique to extend
analysis capabilities towards encrypted traffic [61]. For instance, while DPI cannot
by default access encrypted streams, it could still facilitate censorship by means of
a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on PET by analysing IP and TCP headers [61].
Countermeasures in this case focus on obfuscating PET traffic [63, 60]. For exam-
ple, Tor’s obfsproxy [43] is implemented to mock the behaviour of the widely used
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, relying on the essential role that TLS plays
in other communications, and the fact that it must be permitted as a key requirement
to enable e-commerce in a given region.
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There is a known threat to users of PET of powerful adversaries with access to
Autonomous Systems (AS) or Internet Exchanges (IX), who are in strong tactical
position to view or gain access to large portions of Internet traffic, potentially al-
lowing passive traffic association to take place [57, 51]. While the Tor threat model
states that it does not protect against adversaries that can view both sides of a cir-
cuit, the Tor path selection algorithm does take steps to reduce the chance of this
happening [15, 34] and therefore such an adversary is obviously of concern to the
developers and users of the system.
In this work we present a novel algorithm that could act as a fundamental pil-
lar of a Threat Intelligence Platform for use by AS and IX operators either alone,
or in collaboration with trusted peers. The algorithm may allow operators to iden-
tify encrypted connections engaging in activity that is against their acceptable use
policies or terms and conditions of use. The algorithm fingerprints TCP connection
meta-data and supplies a fully automated routine to assist with the effective degra-
dation of un-traceability of PET users. The proposed algorithm combines several
previously documented techniques. The algorithm can classify network streams ac-
cording to flow metrics, make use of BGP interception if necessary to increase the
attack surface for traffic association, and also manipulate server-side traffic destined
for the client. Our initial test results show that MITM manipulated server responses
lead to expected changes received by the Tor client. Using simulation data generated
by shadow, we show that the detection scheme is effective with false positive rate of
0.001, while sensitivity detecting non-targets was 0.016±0.127. We believe that the
algorithm can be further improved or adapted in order to improve detection rates and
efficiencies in performance. Our algorithm could assist collaborating organisations
willing to share their threat intelligence or cooperate during investigations.
The traffic association methods alone may prove useful to routing providers that
wish to engage in intelligence-sharing, by allowing a risk score to be assigned to
flows that demonstrate particular behaviour. TCP flow metrics could be combined
with other scoring metrics that service providers wish to use, or may highlight can-
didates for the traffic manipulation or BGP interception components. Such collabo-
ration between providers could lead to improved overall risk-reduction or may prove
valuable during forensics investigations.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 contains back-
ground and discussion of existing works describing attack and defence mechanisms
relevant to our work. Then, Section 1.3 introduces an adaptive traffic association
and BGP interception algorithm (ATABI) against Tor. In section 1.4 we present our
initial experimentation and results and discuss them in 1.5. Finally, the chapter is
concluded in Section 1.6.
1.2 Background
It is important for any organisation to have some handle on the common, generic,
and opportunistic attacks that they may be subject to. For larger or more risk-averse
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organisations, there is a case for being aware of more targeted attacks, and applica-
ble Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) [42]. Threat intelligence can be generated
from a variety of resources that a typical organisation has access to, such as web
server logs, firewall logs, mail logs, antivirus, and host or network intrusion detec-
tion systems [38]. The consumption and interpretation of such data can become a
challenge due to the large volumes often generated, leading to a case of being unable
to see the wood for the trees, or searching for a needles in a haystacks [45]. Often
critical to identifying threats is the challenging task of defining the baseline and
understanding what normal activity actually looks like [59]. Furthermore, threats
are ever evolving, and older threats often tend to become benign as more effective
techniques take over, or when law enforcement take down command and control
infrastructure [41].
The primary goal of CTI, then, is to inform organisations of what the current
threats are so that appropriate actions can be taken, with as much automation as
possible [7]. To this end machine learning, big data analytics, and intelligence shar-
ing techniques have become more common in modern Security and Information and
Event Management (SIEM) and CTI systems [50]. Primary customers of such tech-
nology are always going to be determined by factors such as their risk profile, risk
appetite, and of course the size of their security budget [7].
1.2.1 Analysis of Attack Vectors in Tor
Having a variety of threat intelligence sources increases an organisation’s ability
to identify threats early on in a typical series of sequential actions leading to data
breach. Where PET such as Tor is concerned, the ability to inject relays allows an
observer to become a part of the network, and when they are participating as an
entrance or exit node, the source or the destination of traffic could be recorded by
a threat management platform. Indeed, many attacks against Tor users require vis-
ibility of both the entrance and exit traffic [34, 57]. Injection of relays is typically
simple to achieve as PET systems are mostly designed to allow anyone to participate
as a user or a router of traffic [53, 64, 31, 12, 32, 54, 1, 3, 5]. As such, adversaries
can easily initiate rogue routers in order to conduct active traffic analysis by inject-
ing traffic into legitimate communication channels in an attempt to enumerate and
analyse underlying traffic [31, 32].
These common and easy-to-deploy attacks may effectively expose anonymous
communications, and the current authors assert that they may also give service
providers and collaborating organisations the opportunity to record and share ob-
served behaviour originating from specific locations. The more routers that are com-
promised by the adversary, the greater the probability that circuits will start being
built using those routers as entrance and exit nodes. This comes with a financial cost
increasing over time with the total number of Tor relays in existence. It is possible
with this prerequisite for a Tor exit relay to insert a signal into the traffic that can be
detected by an entry relay [31]. This is accomplished by making changes to the Tor
4
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application code to control at what point write events are made, which result in out-
put buffers being flushed. By controlling whether either one or three cells 1 are sent
in an individual Internet Protocol (IP) packet, it is possible to create a binary signal.
If the signal created by the exit relay matches the signal received by the entry relay,
then the user will be discovered along with the visited website. The obstacle that
must be overcome by an adversary to perpetrate this class of attack is in getting the
target to use entry and exit routers belonging to an adversary, or in gaining control
of routers belonging to other operators.
Some of the most powerful attacks against PET are those possible if an adversary
has access to AS or IX routing infrastructure [33, 21, 62, 34, 18, 51, 57], as this
position greatly increases the possibility of observing traffic destined for servers that
are participating as relays. More specifically, it has been reported that the probability
of an adversary with IX-level access serving ASes appearing on both sides of a
circuit is much greater than previously estimated [57]. This is due to traffic between
the user and the entry relay, and also between the exit relay and website, passing
through several routers existing in multiple ASes and IXes.
Another previous study conducted a real-world analysis of distribution of IXes
on Tor entry and exit relay network paths to estimate the probability of the same
IX or AS appearing at both ends of a circuit [34]. This involved running traceroute
analysis from Tor clients to entry nodes, as well as from remote destination websites
back to Tor exit nodes. All router points on the discovered route were then associ-
ated with an AS and an IX using available IP to AS number reference systems and
IX mapping data. It was reported that one specific AS had a 17% chance of routing
traffic for both ends of an established circuit, and a specific IX had a 73% chance
[34]. This would ultimately allow completely passive analysis and correlation of
traffic for large portions of the Tor network, and allow association of website inter-
action by a Tor user. This class of attack has a high level of sophistication due to the
level of access required, and also due to the amount of processing power necessary
to analyse the traffic and correlate traffic patterns. Organizations that do have the
required access could make use of this capability to perpetrate such attacks them-
selves or share it with other parties. Changes to the Tor node selection algorithm
have been suggested to reduce the feasibility of this attack by taking into account
specific ASes and IXes on the paths between relay nodes [34].
It has been suggested that little attention has been given to application-level at-
tacks against low-latency anonymous networks such as Tor [58]. A potential attack
was presented in which attackers compromised multiple routers in the Tor network
with only one web request to de-anonymise a client. However, there are several other
requirements and caveats. Firstly, the target must construct circuits using compro-
mised relays. Secondly, separate relay commands must be set up for each request
and it’s not clear whether this would work with simultaneous requests such as those
over HTTP/1.1. The attack is noted as becoming far less effective if the client is par-
ticipating in concurrent browsing activity, as this will dilute or completely hide the
signal created. Furthermore, certain active circuits can be multiplexed over a single
1 Individual and equal-sized 512 byte unit of Tor traffic [15]
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Unidentifiability & 
Untraceability
Fig. 1.1 Hidden Services Protocol [15]
TCP stream with variations of the traffic pattern. Further developments by [20] iden-
tified that HTTP GET requests are typically encapsulated within a single Tor cell.
The authors discussed how previous work on fingerprinting in single-hop encrypted
connections such as SSH tunnels or openVPN was based on the fact that variations
in web asset sizes are useful for allowing association of encrypted traffic to finger-
printed websites. However, since the introduction of HTTP/1.1 and the support for
persistent connections handling concurrent requests, such attacks became largely in-
effective due to overlapping web asset requests. As a result, attention quickly turned
to packet sizes and timing. An important assumption in [20] is that HTTP GET
requests exist in a single outbound cell from the client. The proposition is that by
delaying these outbound packets by a small period between the client and the entry
guard, overlaps between HTTP GET requests and server responses can be removed.
This creates much cleaner traffic patterns for analysis and could overcome one of
the possible limitations of [58], as already discussed.
1.2.2 Hidden Services
The nature of Tor hidden services provides a number of challenges in collecting and
analysing traffic, because by their very design the service host is intended to remain
anonymous [15]. Many hidden services, or ”deepnet” sites can be found using pub-
licly available indexes. Such hidden services can then be fingerprinted for traffic
analysis by a Tor client, but the wider challenge is in identifying and profiling sites
that are not indexed in this way, or accessible by invitation only. There is research
6
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into attacks on hidden services in Tor [64, 28, 18], which, as stated, are as much of
a problem for the provider of that service as the visiting user due to hidden service
operators often wishing to remain anonymous. A brief overview of hidden service
operation is provided in figure 1.1. For Tor networks in particular, running a hid-
den service comes with the greatest risk due to the ease with which an adversary
can identify the service host [28]. Three separate attacks namely circuit classifica-
tion, circuit fingerprinting, and website fingerprinting against Tor hidden services
were described in [28] based on the assumption that it is possible to fingerprint the
process of connecting to a hidden service. The ability to identify hidden services
is significantly greater than association of normal user behaviour due largely to the
much smaller number of hosts and typically more static content provided by hidden
services compared to the open Internet [28]. Adversarial operators of hidden service
directories may record the addresses of otherwise unadvertised hidden services to
launch application level attacks [40].
There are many ways of covertly tracking a user’s behaviour on the Internet such
as cookies, server logs, and web beacons. Most PET technology will provide or sup-
port fit-for-purpose precautionary measures [44]. However, some attacks, especially
against hidden services, may simply take advantage of the human factor. For ex-
ample, configuration error is a large risk for inexperienced users of the i2p system
[11] as well as Tor hidden service hosts. Hidden services can be erroneously hosted
on a public-facing interface, or on a server that otherwise also hosts public infor-
mation and gives away it’s identity through private key fingerprints or other unique
service information [11]. It is therefore recognised that PET systems are vulnerable
to configuration errors.
1.2.3 Combining Methods
Little research attention has been drawn to the possibility that with sufficient re-
sources, a powerful adversary could combine several documented attacks to further
augment degradation of anonymity. Such combined methods are likely to have vary-
ing compatibility with each other but the potential end result would be some combi-
nation of an increased success rate, and a reduction in number of resources required
as part of the attack itself. Considering the range of known attack methods against
PET introduced above, we will now present a novel algorithm. Our algorithm com-
bines a number of these previous attacks with a level of automatic adaptation to
assist with reduction in un-traceability of Tor users. This can provide a fundamental
pillar of a threat intelligence platform capable of identifying threats making use of
PET.
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1.3 Adaptive Traffic Association
and BGP Interception
Algorithm (ATABI)
Normally, the Tor client chooses three relay nodes to route encrypted traffic. Each
node in turn then removes a layer of encryption, before the unencrypted traffic leaves
the network towards its destination. Therefore, and as depicted in figure 1.2 step
1, server responses destined for the client are unencrypted until they re-enter the
tor network, unless the website implements its own TLS encryption. Once the re-
sponses reach the exit relay (OR3) they are encrypted within the Tor network (step
2). Responses travelling between the entry relay (OR1) and the client are also en-
crypted as part of the established Tor circuit (step 3). For simplification, the follow-
ing description assumes that an entity is interested in generating threat intelligence
relating to undesirable use of PET on their infrastructure without being concerned
about the potential repercussions of carrying out the methods described. A more
pragmatic approach might be to collaborate with other service providers to perform
wider passive analysis and reconnaissance, and agreeing about circumstances that
collaborating entities are permitted to make BGP announcements for the purposes
of association or investigation. Obviously operators could also share the necessary
information with their collaborators without the need for BGP updates to gain addi-
tional network visibility.
As previously mentioned, the published research does not contain many detailed
examples of combining known attacks against Tor, especially given the highly ad-
vantageous Man in the Middle (MITM) position provided to an AS- or IX-level
entity. For instance, HTTP response traffic can be modified while in-transit with
sophisticated regular expression (regex) search and replace methods [29, 36]. We
propose that these or similar techniques can be used by an AS- or IX-level entity
to manipulate server response traffic sent between websites and Tor exit nodes des-
tined for the user. This will allow modification of HTTP responses sent back to the
browser in order to directly affect or control client behaviour, while removing some
of the obstacles to previous attacks such as having to compromise the website itself
or for users to have JavaScript enabled in their browser. Obviously this kind of attack
is considerably easier on clear text websites as opposed to HTTPS sites employing
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or TLS protocols, as in these cases the adversary would
also have to gain visibility of server-side encrypted traffic. There are several known
attacks against HTTPS that adversaries may be able to leverage to facilitate this, or
they may simply have gained access to the private keys of a root or intermediate
certificate authority [16, 37]. The AS or IX operator may instead wish to investigate
watermarking techniques to avoid compromising HTTPS. The scope of this study is
limited to testing HTTP traffic only assuming that HTTPS is either not enforced, or
has been compromised.
Let us assume that an AS or IX operator has identified a website for which they
wish to identify the users. If this entity has the capability of instigating a BGP
interception attack, then they might begin by enumerating the list of all prefixes
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Tor Network
Encrypted Responses
Website
OR1
OR2
OR3
1
2
3
Unencrypted Responses
Encrypted Tor traffic
Fig. 1.2 Server Responses in Tor
hosting Tor relays that they do not already have visibility of, or perhaps for loca-
tions that they believe to be likely sources of the traffic. With this information and
the known prefix of the destination website, a BGP interception attack could be
launched against all of these prefixes, thus getting complete visibility of the entry
and exit traffic of interest. The challenge is then to associate the website traffic with
the encrypted Tor entry traffic.
We present an algorithm 1 that considers whether or not an adversary already
has visibility of their intended targets and performs BGP interception if necessary.
The algorithm waits for a trigger condition such as a security alert, indicator of
compromise, or manual initiation before saving all required network traffic to disk
for analysis. Our algorithm consists of three components: BGP interception, MITM
server response manipulation (using MITMProxy [36]), and a detection scheme.
The full algorithm can be described as follows (see figure 1.3):
1. The IX-level adversary initiates a BGP interception against the subjects of inter-
est, for instance a destination website. BGP interception can also be performed
to gain increased visibility of client to entry-side traffic.
2. The adversary routes unencrypted web server response traffic through a manipu-
lator in order to change the HTTP responses as required, for instance by inserting
assets.
3. The traffic then enters the Tor network via the exit relay. From this point back to
the client, responses remain encrypted as per the Tor implementation.
4. The adversary performs traffic analysis with the detection scheme on traffic des-
tined for the client at point 2 (unencrypted) and point 4 (encrypted).
The expected outcome is that as routes start to converge, the adversary gains
visibility of all traffic destined for that website as well as the proportion of Tor
entry node traffic of interest. The MITMproxy configuration forces page responses
to include large assets that increase traffic for users that the adversary desires. As
mentioned, this attack has a high level of sophistication due to the type of access
required by AS or IX Internet routing systems. However, for entities with that level
of access, updating routing to flow through another system running some form of
manipulation software would be straightforward. We believe that this is entirely
achievable for a service provider or group of collaborating providers.
A number of assumptions based on previous research support the proposed algo-
rithm. Firstly, we assume it is feasible to associate traffic behaviour to individuals if
9
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Fig. 1.3 Adaptive Traffic Association and BGP Interception
both sides of the connection can be observed [31, 22, 23]. Secondly, BGP routing at-
tacks by an AS or IX operator can allow observation of large or specific proportions
of Internet traffic [51, 57]. Finally, HTTPS is not always implemented, or may be
vulnerable to a range of attacks, and can be vulnerable to watermarking techniques
[16, 37].
1.3.1 BGP Interception Component
We consider the recently disclosed attack known as RAPTOR (Routing Attacks on
Privacy in Tor) [51], which is a further development on previous works such as [57].
Such routing attacks are one example that could place a powerful adversary at great
advantage, if they have access to core Internet routing infrastructure. These works
describe three main assumptions that can be approached either individually or in
combination to increase the exploitability of the system.
First, Internet routing is asymmetric in its nature. In other words, the path that
an outgoing packet takes is not necessary the same as that of its reply, and visibility
of only one direction of this traffic flow is required to analyse traffic. Therefore
the attack surface and likelihood of exposure to an adversary performing a passive
traffic association attack are greatly increased.
Second, BGP ”churn” over time due to network changes or transient issues such
as router failures increases the chances that a regular user of Tor will cross paths
with a particular AS or IX, facilitating passive traffic analysis.
Finally, it is possible for an AS operator to make false BGP announcements in
order to have traffic intended for another AS route through their own routers in an
active attack, which positions themselves on a target circuit.
10
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The active attack comes in two versions, hijack and intercept. The drawback of
the hijack is that the traffic never reaches its intended destination and so the client
experience will be interrupted, potentially raising the alarm, or causing a new circuit
to be built. An interception on the other hand allows the traffic to continue to its des-
tination and the client session remains active. There are three possible scenarios for
the interception attack namely: 1) the adversary already monitors a website or exit
node and targets a set of known Tor entry relays; 2) the adversary already monitors
the client to entry relay side and targets known Tor exit relays (or a destination web-
site); 3) the adversary targets both entry and exit traffic in order to perform general
monitoring, data gathering and association. It should be noted that while the impact
of a hijack to a user is obvious, there is no mention of the impact on user experi-
ence in terms of latency, or packet loss while the new routes propagate and converge
during an interception attack.
Once this Man in the Middle position is achieved, the previous authors discussed
the strong feasibility of traffic timing attacks, especially given the benefits of asym-
metric routing. We propose that this MITM position can be put to further use to
provide greater advantage by perpetrating further attacks in combination.
1.3.2 MITM Component
Manipulating traffic is useful for affecting client behaviour. In a large set of similar
candidate connections, the ability to affect those that the entity is interested in and
separate them from the rest is obviously a valuable capability. Below, we demon-
strate in a simple test that manipulation of server responses prior to entering the Tor
network result in the expected client behaviour. We used the MITMProxy applica-
tion to act as a reverse proxy for Apache HTTPd in order to replace:
</body>
With:
<img s r c =” l i n k t o l a r g e f i l e ” wid th =”1 px ” /></body>
We suggest that an example of a real use case may instead need to simply for-
ward traffic for all non-target destinations as required while pattern matching to
manipulate only responses from the target website, and this is possible with MITM-
Proxy filter options. We tested the “--anticache” option and found this to be effective
against a caching server (varnish) in front of our test web server.
The output as observed in TORBrowser without MITMProxy was as follows:
c u r l −−s o c k s 4 a 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 9 0 5 0 h t t p : / / 5 2 . 4 8 . 1 7 . 1 2 6 /
<html>
<head>
</head>
<body>
<d i v a l i g n =” c e n t e r”>
<p>Welcome home !! !< / p>
</d iv>
</body>
</html>
And with MITMProxy running with search and replace on the body tag resulted
to:
11
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c u r l −−s o c k s 4 a 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 9 0 5 0 h t t p : / / 5 2 . 4 8 . 1 7 . 1 2 6 /
<html>
<head>
</head>
<body>
<d i v a l i g n =” c e n t e r”>
<p>Welcome home !! !< / p>
</d iv>
<img s r c = ” / dsc 0575 . j p g ” wid th =”1 px”/></body>
</html>
Note the additional image being included prior to the closing body tag, which is
a 3.5MB JPEG but resized to one by one pixel so as not to be obvious. The image in
this test also resided on the web server, but could just as easily be hosted elsewhere.
However, hosting assets with another site may require alterations to the detection
scheme.
1.3.3 Detection Scheme
Algorithm 1 includes the detection scheme, which is useful for fingerprinting con-
nections and consists of a reduction function based on a set of filters applied in
sequence. The goal is to eliminate client connection streams that are unlikely to be
responsible for the observed server-side traffic, based on their meta-data. We pro-
pose that this may be useful in assigning a risk score to any client connections that
remain after applying the detection scheme. Such scoring may be useful for later
interpretation or alerting by Bayesian analysis or machine learning systems. Specif-
ically, server-side sessions are fingerprinted by recording specific metrics including
the start and end time of the connection (SCt in Algorithm 1), total number of pack-
ets sent to the client (t p), average time distance between successive packets (at),
total data sent (td), and total transmission time (tt). Similar metrics have been used
in previous studies [22, 23, 31], however we believe our specific generation and
treatment of these metrics is novel in its approach.
The same metrics are generated for all other observed connections. Once this
fingerprinting is complete, reduction begins by first filtering for only connections
that fit within the same time period as the server-side connection (CCt). Thereafter,
remaining connections are filtered for similarity using the same metrics already dis-
cussed in turn, starting by leaving only those with similar total number of packets
(CCt p), then similar average time between packets (CCat), similar total data re-
ceived (CCtd), and finally, similar total transmission time (CCtt). Any remaining
client connections are returned as possible candidates for the observed server-side
connection in question. Moreover, our proposal is that average time distance be-
tween individual packets can act as the filter, followed by similar total amount of
data sent, and then finally similar total transmission time.
The detection scheme is adaptive in the sense that an initial tolerance is set and if
no candidates are found, the filter is performed again after automatically increasing
the tolerance. In our initial tests, we selected a base interval of ±1% for increasing
tolerances. This proved effective in our tests, but is adaptable and may improved in
further work. This occurs for each of the discussed metrics in turn. For example, the
12
1 Adaptive Traffic Fingerprinting for Darknet Threat Intelligence 13
Algorithm 1 Traffic Association
1: function BGPINTERCEPT(target)
2: Initiate BGP Interception against target
3:
4: function COMPUTESTATS(connection)
5: t p = Total number of packets in connection
6: at = Average time between packets in connection
7: td = Total data sent in connection
8: tt = Total duration of connection
9: return t p,at, td, tt
10:
11: if Target website traffic not visible then BGPIntercept website
12:
13: if Suspect clients traffic not visible then BGPIntercept clients
14:
15: while trigger 6= 1 do
16: Check for trigger condition
17:
18: while ServerConnection = active do
19: Initiate MITM manipulation of server responses
20: Save all network traffic to disk
21:
22: for all ServerConnections do
23: SCt = Timeframe of ServerConnection
24: SC = ComputeStats serverconnection
25: return SC
26:
27: for all ClientConnections do
28: CC = ComputeStats clientconnection
29: return CC
30: for all SC do
31: Set initial tolerances
32: CCt = list of CC where CC packets are in the same time frame as SCt
33:
34: CCt p =CCt where CCt has similar total number of packets as SC
35: if CCt p = 0 then Increase tolerance by ±1% and repeat
36: if tolerance ≥ max tolerance then Stop
37:
38: CCat =CCt p where CCt p has similar average time between packets as SC
39: if CCat = 0 then Increase tolerance by ±1% and repeat
40: if tolerance ≥ max tolerance then Stop
41:
42: CCtd =CCat where CCat has similar total data sent as SC
43: if CCtd = 0 then Increase tolerance by ±1% and repeat
44: if tolerance ≥ max tolerance then Stop
45:
46: CCtt =CCtd where CCtd has similar total transmission time as SC
47: if CCtt = 0 then Increase tolerance by ±1% and repeat
48: if tolerance ≥ max tolerance then Stop
49:
50: return SC,CCtt
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check for total packets sent will increase from ±5% by ±1% until at least one can-
didate is returned, up until a maximum tolerance level. Maximum tolerances were
chosen simply to avoid the algorithm continuing indefinitely until candidates are
returned that are highly unlikely to be those responsible for the server-side connec-
tion of interest. Any candidates found are passed to the next step in the detection
scheme. The starting tolerance, incremental amount, and maximum tolerance are all
configurable and were chosen by the present authors during testing as they proved
to be effective with our data. We anticipate that future research will allow tolerance
values to be set automatically by machine learning systems based on measurable
factors including network conditions such as latency, packet loss, and jitter.
We will discuss experimental results following initial testing of the detection
component of the algorithm, and offer a discussion of current design and perfor-
mance. We use several key performance indicators (KPI’s) used in typical binary
classification systems to evaluate the effectiveness of the detection scheme. Our ra-
tionale for choosing these KPI’s was due to the similarity to clinical studies in which
a test is evaluated based on its ability to correctly diagnose members of a popula-
tion with a condition, while keeping false positives to a minimum. KPI’s include
sensitivity (se, percentage of target clients correctly identified as candidates for a
server-side connection), specificity (sp, percentage of non-target clients who are
correctly excluded from the list of candidates), false positive rate ( f pr, percentage
of non-target clients who are incorrectly included in list of candidates), and false
negative rate ( f nr, percentage of victim clients who are incorrectly excluded from
the list of candidates). For completeness, we also report the positive predictive value
(ppv, percentage of included candidates who were truly responsible), and negative
predictive value (npv, percentage of excluded clients who were truly not responsi-
ble).
1.4 Experimentation and Results
1.4.1 Experiment Setup
We used shadow [26] to create simulated networks and generate PCAP data for
analysis. Shadow was used due to being readily available, easily accessible, multi-
threading capability, simulation of transient network issues, its use of real Tor code,
and the fact that it is still actively maintained [49]. Shadow and shadow-plugin-tor
were built from the project source code available on github. The tgen plugin was
used for the purposes of generating traffic on the network. This plugin makes use of
graphml XML files that control the behaviour of a particular client such as which
servers to download from, how large a download should be, how many downloads to
complete, and how long to pause between each download. The latest stable release
of Tor code (0.2.7.6 - 2015-12-10, at the time of experimentation) was used with
shadow-plugin-tor.
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In sizing our simulation network, we referred to [19] in which two separate ex-
periments were conducted as follows; First, to test the feasibility of an attack, the au-
thors implemented a small scale experiment consisting of 20 relays, 190 web clients
and 10 bulk clients. Secondly, A larger network was also constructed by the authors
based on the work of [27] consisting of 400 relays, 3000 clients, and 400 servers.
Our approach was similar, implementing small networks for speed of simulations in
order to debug any problems, and to develop and test the detection scheme. We then
created a larger network resulting in more time-consuming simulation andgreater
data generation for our testing.
AWS EC2 instances were used for running our simulations. With our time and
budgetary constraints in mind, an m4.2xlarge AWS EC2 instance of 8 cores and
32GB memory was used to run simulations on a network containing 4 authority
servers, 400 relays, 1000 clients, and 400 web servers. Generation of the network
topology was based on tor metrics and server descriptors for the month of April
2016 (2016-04-30).
The 1000 clients included 989 similar web clients all set to download a 350KiB
file every 60 seconds, and 10 bulk clients set to download a 5MiB file repeatedly
without pausing. There were also two 50KiB, 1MiB, and 5MiB clients downloading
every 60 seconds. The actual downloaded data is arbitrary and randomly generated
by shadow in order to provide simulation data. To simulate increased traffic for a
victim (e.g. following a MITM attack) a single default web client as provided by
shadow was set to download a 2MiB file.
Due to the fact that shadow records session information for all clients, servers,
and relays, it is straightforward to confirm from simulation output which client was
actually responsible for a particular server connection. The process for running a
particular test of the detection scheme was automated and involved the following
steps:
• Inspect the web client log file for a successful download and take note of the time
of the download and name of the destination web server.
• Inspect the web server log file for the correct download (which shadow helpfully
confirms in the logs) and take note of the connecting exit relay session tuple (IP
and port number).
• Run the algorithm against the given web server PCAP file and record connec-
tion tuple information of all clients’ PCAP data in order to detect candidates for
responsible clients.
The detection scheme is not currently multi-threaded but result generation for
detection performance was scripted and split between 16 cores on a c3.4xlarge EC2
instance with 30GB memory, and with 9000 Input Output Operations Per Second
(IOPS).
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Fig. 1.4 No. Clients vs Detection Run Time (s)
Table 1.1 Single Detection Result Matrix
Test Result
Client Target Non Target
Target (t p = 1) ( f n = 0) (t = 1)
Non Target ( f p = 2) (tn = 197) (nt = 199)
Total 3 197 (n = 200)
1.4.2 Evaluation Criteria
Figure 1.4 illustrates a linear increase in average runtime of the detection scheme
against a single session to identify a specific client amongst a group of 50, 100, 200,
500, and 1000 clients. This is indicative of the one to many relationship between a
target connection on a server, and the variable number of potential candidates.
The detection scheme was tested by implementing in python against every client
in turn within a particular set of simulation data and the detection performance KPI’s
were calculated. For a given detection attempt in a network of n clients, the total
number of targets t will only ever be 1, with all other clients being non-targets
(nt = n− t). This is because there is only ever one client that was truly responsible
for a specific server-side connection. Using a diagnostic classification matrix, the
outcome for a detection attempt contains values for true positives t p, being either
1 or 0; false negatives f n, (being the inverse of t p given that there is only ever one
true target); false positives where 0 ≤ f p ≤ (nt − 1); and true negatives tn where
0 ≤ tn ≤ (n−1) and tn = nt− f p. A typical output from our testing is reflected in
table 1.1.
Performance KPI’s are all percentages in the range 0 ≤ KPI ≤ 1. Sensitivity
se is calculated as se = t pt and will always be either 1 or 0 as there is only one
target. Specificity sp is calculated as sp = tnnt . False positive rate f pr is calculated as
f pr = f pnt or 1−sp. False negative rate f nr will always be 0 or 1 and is calculated as
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Table 1.2 Detection Performance Comparison
Test
A B C D E Test A Victim
se 0.016±0.127 0.558±0.497 0.485±0.500 0.279±0.449 0.008±0.090 1.000
sp 1.000±0.001 0.981±0.014 0.986±0.010 0.993±0.006 1.000±0.000 0.999
f pr 0.000±0.001 0.019±0.014 0.014±0.010 0.007±0.006 0.000±0.000 0.001
f nr 0.984±0.127 0.442±0.497 0.515±0.500 0.721±0.449 0.992±0.090 0.000
ppv 0.012±0.100 0.073±0.186 0.075±0.192 0.065±0.181 0.008±0.090 0.500
npv 0.999±0.000 1.000±0.001 0.999±0.001 0.999±0.000 0.999±0.000 1.000
Victim Detected: True True False False False True
f nr = f nt or 1−se. Positive predictive value is ppv = t pt p+ f p and Negative predictive
value is npv = tnf n+tn .
1.4.3 Results
We ran the detection scheme against all clients five times for the largest simulation
data, varying the percentages of tolerance in order to identify whether there was an
optimised tolerance for the different metrics. Tolerances for each metric began at
±5% in every test and as per the algorithm, increased by ±1% until candidates are
returned or until the maximum tolerance is reached. These results are presented in
table 1.2. The tolerance values tested were (number of packets, average packet time,
total data, total time): 52,32,2,1 (A); 100,50,25,5 (B); 50,50,25,5 (C); 50,50,10,5
(D); 25,25,5,1 (E)
The results table also includes a column showing detection performance KPI’s
for the MITM victim during Test (A). The first test (A) used tolerance values tai-
lored to achieve the best detection of the correct MITM victim target. Subsequent
tests were performed to quantify detection KPI performance in general, and also
tested against the MITM victim. Test (B) allowed a maximum tolerance of ±100%
for similar number of packets and resulted in larger numbers of candidates to be
included for classification according to the other metrics. Test results show how the
performance KPI’s are affected by changing the maximum tolerance values of the
algorithm. Test (A) clearly performs poorly overall, however is highly successful in
terms of true positive and false positive rates. This might be expected as test (A) was
designed for detection of the MITM victim.
With these maximum tolerance values set, the correct target was identified only
16 times out of 984 total attempts, while detection performance of the MITM victim
client with these tolerance values was very high. Detection of the MITM victim was
achieved with a sensitivity of 1 (average for all other detections against non-victims
= 0.016±0.127), specificity of 0.999 (average = 1±0.001) and a false positive rate
of 0.001 (average = 0±0.001).
Test (B) correctly identified the MITM victim, and also correctly identified other
targets with a sensitivity of 0.558 ±0.497 and false positive rate of 0.019±0.014.
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Detection performance whilst searching for the victim with these tolerances had a
sensitivity of 1 and f pr of 0.003, which indicates an improvement over detection of
non-victims.
Tests (C,D,E) all failed to identify the MITM victim and achieved decreasing
detection performance KPI’s as per table 1.2.
1.5 Discussion
Our tests indicate a poor detection performance for any client while using maximum
tolerances for total number of packets, average inter-packet time, and total data sent,
and lower maximum tolerance for total connection time (Test (B). While the MITM
victim was detected with these tolerances, three false positives were also identified
as candidates. With fine tuned tolerances for the MITM victim in Test (A), detec-
tion performance for other targets is poor, while the victim detection was successful
with just 1 false positive. This suggests that getting the tolerances right is critical
to success. Furthermore, with further development and testing, tolerances could be
automatically defined based on external factors such as network conditions or fac-
tors that the adversary can control, such as the size or number of inserted assets.
It may also be worth investigating the splitting of individual connections into sec-
tions that can be individually fingerprinted with the same metrics. The relationship
between sections when comparing client to server-side traffic may yield improved
detection rates thanks to temporal variations in network conditions. We note that
the runtime performance of the detection scheme is not currently scalable, and that
there are opportunities for further efficiencies to be added. Machine learning in par-
ticular is of interest as a solution for eliminating candidates when performing the
traffic association element.
A general strength of this algorithm is that it does not require Tor nodes to be
injected or compromised. The algorithm is simplified and only requires average and
total statistics to be calculated for some individual flow meta data for comparison.
By using average data for connections rather than considering all inter-packet tim-
ing data for comparison, minor transient network issues such as short-term jitter and
packet loss are expected to have a reduced impact on detection, however false posi-
tives may be more of a problem when larger data sets are available. Shadow allows
for random and transient variables such as bandwidth, computing power, packet
loss, and jitter to be simulated in order to mimic real network connections and with
these default measures in place, our initial results are positive.
The application layer component of this algorithm relies on visibility of unen-
crypted traffic between the exit node and the destination, in contrast to watermark-
ing techniques, which operate purely by embedding a signal into the packet timing.
Previous attacks such as SWIRL are also blind, meaning that as long as the water-
marker and detector both know the watermarking secret, no other data needs to be
synchronised between them. Our attack requires that the metadata descriptors of the
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entry- and exit-side connection be shared with whichever system is performing the
algorithm, at less than 150bytes per connection.
The attack also assumes that the client is only participating in activity on one
destination website. Because the onion proxy multiplexes all outgoing connections
through a single connection to an entry guard, if several client activities are con-
current then the algorithm will not currently deal with this. However, if we assume
that in most cases users of Tor will be browsing one page at any one time, the time
slicing of the client side multiplexed connection would in that case only include the
relevant data pertaining to the observed exit-side traffic.
We currently make no attempt to remove Tor control cells from the client side
connection data. The tolerance level in the algorithm helps to account for this, but
a future improvement to the algorithm might wish to take this into account as dis-
cussed in [20]. Total data received by the client in a particular window could simply
be indicative of client bandwidth limitations. Therefore, for a given time window
of the exit-side traffic, there is a risk that other Tor users with similar bandwidth
restrictions could appear in the set of candidates, even if they are accessing com-
pletely different sites. However this still allows for correlation with the exit-side
traffic thanks to the inter-packet timing and total data sent for individual connec-
tions. We also note that compared to watermarking techniques, the performance
impact of embedding large assets would perhaps be more noticeable in text only
applications, image-sparse forums, or bulletin board systems.
1.5.1 Use Cases
It has previously been presented that a small number of very large ASes are naturally
in a position to see at least one end of a circuit due purely to their size [51]. Ten
ASes were shown to have visibility of at least 50% of all Tor circuits, with some
providers seeing over 90%. This would place these providers in a prime position
to generate threat intelligence data points based on traffic analysis, or to initiate
BGP updates to hijack or intercept traffic during investigations. The initial threat
intelligence gathering could lead to triggering a BGP routing update under certain
conditions, such as a security alert. It is worth noting that there are numerous entities
and organisations that monitor BGP activity on the internet and report suspected
interception incidents [4]. As such, anomalies are generally reported in forums and
news sites fairly quickly when they do occur. However, this does not imply that
organisations will not carry out such methods anyway, only that they are more likely
to be detected, reported and discussed.
We imagine two preliminary use cases for our algorithm during investigations.
Firstly, an adversary may have little or no idea of the location of the sources of
traffic destined for a particular website. The objective here would be a wide BGP
interception attack against all traffic that the adversary does not already have vis-
ibility of. This would be a large-scale attack and require significant resource for
injecting the HTML into responses and processing the traffic to identify the sources
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responsible. An alternative to reduce the overhead would be to engage in a number
of smaller attacks iterating through multiple source locations. In this case the BGP
interception attacks would be targeted at the smaller IP ranges in sequence together
with the destination if required. As discussed, another alternative would be if AS or
IX operators participate in threat information exchange, or agree terms under which
such BGP routing updates are acceptable.
Secondly, the adversary may have a good idea of where the source of traffic is
coming from, for instance in a criminal investigation where a suspect is believed to
reside in a particular area. In this case, the adversary may be fortunate enough to
already have visibility of the required IP ranges thanks to asymmetric routing but
if not, then would only have to perpetrate a much smaller BGP interception attack
based on the suspect’s location.
While our presented algorithm applies to Tor clients accessing public Internet
sites, similar techniques could be applied to Tor hidden services. For instance, if
an operator was to first identify a remote hidden service, then they could repeatedly
make custom requests to it during a widespread BGP interception attack (or working
with collaborators) while running the detection scheme. If detection of the hidden
service were to prove successful, then BGP interception and detection could be used
to identify clients of the hidden service, or the adversary could target the hosting
system directly in other ways, leading to further attacks.
1.5.2 Proposed Defences
To mitigate against the HTML injection component, Tor nodes could consider disal-
lowing port 80/HTTP in their exit policy. This may be strongly advised in any case
considering the typical Tor user’s privacy concerns as well as the wider industry
moving towards HTTPS everywhere, and HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS).
If blocking port 80 is too problematic for user experience or website functionality,
then the only other option is for website operators to correctly implement HTTPS
and make use of HSTS. Users that care deeply about their privacy should insist
on using HTTPS websites and avoid the use of HTTP sites for accessing or shar-
ing sensitive information. This will still not help if the adversary has the ability to
compromise HTTPS, but would make success for the adversary significantly more
difficult, or force the use of other methods such as watermarking.
The countermeasures suggested by the authors of RAPTOR [51] would all still
apply to the routing component of the current algorithm and therefore deserve a
mention. Monitoring was proposed to raise awareness of the possibility of increased
traffic visibility due to asymmetric routing, BGP churn, or routing attacks, and to
notify clients when a potential degradation of anonymity is identified. BGP and
traceroute monitoring were both suggested and tested with successful results re-
ported.
It was also noted that traditional countermeasures that manipulate packet sizes or
timing come with a significant latency impact and so would remove one of the main
20
1 Adaptive Traffic Fingerprinting for Darknet Threat Intelligence 21
benefits of Tor. A number of alternative countermeasures were proposed, including
incorporating traceroute and AS lookups as part of intelligent selection of relays to
build circuits that avoid routes crossing the same AS multiple times. However, this
may result in lower overall entropy in Tor circuit selection and greater probability
of adversaries with large numbers of injected or compromised relays appearing on
both ends of a circuit.
Another suggested mitigation was that Tor relays should advertise prefixes of /24
to reduce the capability of BGP hijack or interception attacks. Adversaries could
still launch attacks by advertising the same prefix, however the impact of the attack
would be more localized to the adversary and more widespread redirection of Inter-
net traffic would not take place. To further mitigate this reduced capability, it was
suggested that clients could favour guard relays that are closer in terms of number
of AS hops, but that this could reveal probabilistic information about clients, and
requires further investigation. The final suggested mitigation requires that the wider
Internet moves towards secure inter-domain routing, however this has been slow to
get off the ground.
1.6 Conclusion and Future Work
This work has presented a novel algorithm (ATABI) against the Tor network based
on the combination of previously reported HTML injection techniques with BGP
routing attacks and a detection scheme. This algorithm could form a fundamental
pillar of a PET-capable Cyber Threat Intelligence Management platform. A simpli-
fied version of the MITM component was perpetrated against a basic web page to
insert a large hidden asset at the bottom of the HTML. This change in the returned
HTML was observed in the response received by the Tor client. The suggested de-
tection algorithm yielded positive results in initial tests on data generated by the
shadow simulator for Tor. Detection performance of an MITM victim with large
tolerances was good with a f pr of 0.003, while average general detection perfor-
mance of all clients without MITM traffic manipulation was poor with sensitivity
of 0.558±0.497 and f pr of 0.019±0.014. By tailoring the tolerances for the MITM
victim and running against all clients, general performance was greatly reduced with
average sensitivity of 0.016±0.127 and average f nr of 0.984±0.127, while sensi-
tivity when searching for the victim was 1 with a f pr of 0.001.
In future research we intend to evaluate whether temporal patterns manifested
throughout the duration of a session can assist detection by splitting sessions and
fingerprinting each section. We hope to provide more practical examples of routing
attacks facilitating a MITM position and consider other MITM technologies or de-
velopment of a dedicated lightweight application. With further efficiencies such as
multi-threading for an individual attack, performance could be increased to operate
with larger data sets. Increased performance may also be achieved by using GPU, or
distributed computing. Combining the IX-level advantage with other previous con-
cepts such as watermarking schemes, sending custom requests to hidden services,
21
22 REFERENCES
or delaying GET requests but at the exit side rather than the client side are also of
interest. We also plan on performing further simulations and experiments to pro-
duce more data in order to further optimise the tolerance levels for each connection
metric, and provide more data for potential testing and implementation of machine
learning. Given the large number of CTI ontologies available, we would see benefit
in developing our algorithm to be platform agnostic. A worthwhile project would
be the creation of a PET-capable Cyber Threat Intelligence Management Platform
that can interoperate with a wide range of CTI ontologies, with a view to driving
standardisation, and with our algorithm as a fundamental pillar.
We believe that this variety of opportunities to perpetrate previously known at-
tacks against PET more effectively in combination with AS- or IX-level access is
likely to gain more research attention in the future. This likelihood is augmented
especially considering the challenge of attribution in CTI for darknet-based threat
activity.
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